I Introduction
It is well known that in a world with optimal contracts, principals should restrict their agents' discretion over effort and other choices, as additional moral hazard never can be beneficial from the principals' point of view. This paper shows that in a suboptimal contractual arrangement, there are constellations under which the principal is better of by giving more discretion to the agent, even if the agent uses the additional choice in order to maximize her own expected utility. The main result are conditions for a Pareto improvement in a suboptimal contractual arrangement, which will be outlined in the following:
Theory suggests that in a multiperiod principal-agent setting optimal cash flow based contracts should exhibit memory of wages, that is wages should depend on both present and past outcomes. 1 Lambert 2 offers some weak empirical evidence such as raises/pay cuts and promotions/demotions for this theoretical result. Thus the conclusion is allowable that real management compensation is in fact memoryless. From a theoretical perspective, it may be argued that the welfare improvement due to memory may be outweighed by an increment of transaction costs, i.e. costs of writing and specifying the memory contract. Therefore, it is justified to consider a memoryless, suboptimal contractual arrangement. In addition the memoryless contracts are usually based on earnings, not on cash flows. This paper also offers an explanation for this gap between theory and practice. In a two-period hidden-action model, the agent is given the additional discretion to manage earnings at the end of the first period. In the suboptimal, memoryless context it will be proven that at least in a setting without the agent's access to capital markets, earnings-based contracts strictly Pareto-dominate cash flow-based contracts. Welfare gains can be attributed to improved risk sharing. More accurately, earnings management allows the agent to spread first-period risk over both periods. Thus the (risk-neutral) principal can lower the expected wage payment to implement the optimal action pair without violating the agent's reservation utility. Consequently the agency is strictly better off.
1 See Lambert (1983) , p. 447. 2 See Lambert (1981) , p. 100 f.
Earnings management presumes that the revelation principle is not applicable. The revelation principle assumes (1) commitment to the prespecified use of communication, (2) an optimal contract and (3) a rich message space. Different lines in earnings management (often: smoothing) literature weaken distinct dimensions of this principle. 3 Fudenberg/Tirole (1995) and Araya/Glover/Sunder (1998) build on limited commitment to the contracted use of communication, while Healy (1985) and Boylan/Villadsen (1998) use presumed contract forms instead of optimal contractual agreements. This paper is part of the third stream which is grounded on blocked communication -it shall not be possible, without cost, to communicate all dimensions of a rich message space. The model by Evans/Sridhar (1996) is closely related to this paper. Whereas this paper does not limit the reporting discretion, Evans/Sridhar restrict the agent's report to lie in both periods in reporting regions which among others depend on independently distributed signals. The loss of generality in the present paper's model is outweighed by a gain in mathematical tractability. From the intention, Evans/Sridhar contrast a "truthful reporting" 4 with an "earnings management" regime, while this paper confronts the latter with a cash flow scenario. The contribution of Tzur/Yaari (1994) also leaves the reporting flexibility unrestricted. Furthermore, random outputs proxy for productive actions. Their main propositions are problematic, as will be pointed out in the course of the paper.
Demski (1998) also analysis conditions under which profits that are subject to earnings management dominate cash flows for incentive purposes. In his setting, the mechanism that drives the result is given exogenously: The agent only has access to earnings management if she chooses the higher of two possible actions. In contrast, the Pareto-improvement studied in this paper arises endogenously: It is the result of the agent's desire to smooth profits intertemporally.
This paper first introduces the earnings management regime and contrasts it with the memoryless cash flow scenario (section II.1). The agent's strategy is then investigated (section II.2) and optimal contracts under the earnings management regime are characterized from a commitment perspective (section II.3). The central point of the paper is a welfare comparison between (memoryless) cash flow and earnings management regimes (section II.4). The paper concludes with a brief analysis of earnings management in a dynamic principal-agent setting with access to capital markets (section III).
II Earnings Management without Access to Capital Markets 1 The Model
A two-period, memoryless principal-agent model without access to capital markets is enriched by the agent's authority to manage earnings. Various assumptions are posed and the notation is introduced in the following:
At the beginning of period 1 the principal offers the agent a two-period contract
with l t = wage in period t for t = 1, 2. If the agent accepts the contract, both parties are committed to remaining in the contract for both periods. The principal has access to a stochastic production technology, parameterized by her agent's productive action a t . By selecting her first-period action a 1 the agent determines the density f 1 (x 1 /a 1 ) representing first period's technology. She privately observes the first period's cash flow x 1 and makes a report y 1 (also referred to as "earnings") with
where B denotes the extent, positive or negative, of earnings management. Thus the revelation principle is not applicable (see introduction).
Subsequently the agent chooses her second period action a 2 and f 2 (x 2 /a 2 ). She privately learns second period's cash flow x 2 and reports y 2 with
Definitions (1) and (2) imply that the firm's reporting system has the tidiness, summing up or clean surplus property.
The principal is supposedly not able to observe each period's cash flow, but she learns the cummulative cash flow x:
As the contract has to be based on mutually observable variables, the agent's rewards have to be based on the reports:
The principal is assumed to be risk-neutral. She is informed about the preferences of her strictly riskand strictly work-averse agent whose utility is time-separable and separable in income and action with [ ]
with y x B 1 1 
The principal maximizes the expected residuum (EM.1) subject to the constraints (EM.2) to (EM.5).
The individual rationality constraint (EM.2) ensures that the agent receives at least a reservation level of expected utility which is normalized to zero. Constraints (EM.3) and (EM.5) are the incentive compatibility constraints w. r. t. (with regard to) first and second period actions a 2 and a 1 respectively.
(EM.4) implies that the agent will choose earnings management B to maximize her expected utility from that point onwards up to the end of the contracting horizon.
As a proper benchmark a standard two-period principal-agent model without memory, without access to capital markets and without the agent's authority to manage earnings is used. 
Constraint (CF.2) is the individual rationality constraint and (CF.3) and (CF.4) are the incentive compatibility constraints w. r. t. first and second period actions respectively.
As the dynamic cash flow based program with memory is standard and not crucial for the main proposition, it is omitted. In this case a 2 and l 2 would be also referenced to x 1 . If earnings based remuneration functions with memory of wages are used in the following, then in the above program EM, l 2 (y 2 ) would be changed to l 2 (y 1 , y 2 ).
The Agent's Strategy
Consider first a contract without memory. In the equilibrium of the optimal cash flow-based contract (l 1 (x 1 ), l 2 (x 2 )), the agent systematically has an incentive to manage earnings at the end of period 1. She will either underreport or overreport her first period earnings in order to balance the marginal utility of the first period with the expected marginal utility of the second period. The agent thus acts as a smoother.
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Consider now a memory-contract. It can be easily proven that in the equilibrium of the optimal contract (l 1 (x 1 ), l 2 (x 1 , x 2 )), the agent always has the incentive to manage earnings, i.e., B(x 1 ) is not zero for every x 1 . Furthermore, the memory contract implies the agent's tendency to underreport first period's earnings (also referred to as conservative reporting), i. e. B < 0.
6 But there are two other determinants of the agent's reporting behaviour: the forms of the wage functions in the benchmark program CF in both periods and -if considered -the principal's time preference. They may outweigh or overcompensate the underreporting effect inherent in the memory contract.
Both of the following propositions briefly summarize additional properties of the agent's behaviour. As only insufficient information on the shape of the wage schedules l t is available, the agent's equilibrium behaviour cannot be characterized completely. Restrictions on the forms of wage and utility functions have to be imposed (part (i) of each proposition). Reference is made to earnings-based contracts
). In contrast to proposition 1 which can easily be 5
This contrasts Tzur/Yaari (1994) , p. 60, who state that the manager always underreports in their scenario without memory. But as the wages of the first and second periods are not interrelated by the memory-(or a similar) condition, earnings management cannot have a systematic direction (in the sense of either under-or overreporing).
6
A proof following the arguments of Rogerson's (1985) proposition 4 fails because earnings management has only an indirect effect on the agent's utility. The link is the wage on which only insufficient information is available.
extended to memory contracts (l 1 (y 1 ), l 2 (y 1 , y 2 )), the second proposition is only valid for memoryless contracts (l 1 (y 1 ), l 2 (y 2 )).
Proposition 1:
The agent is offered a earnings-based memoryless contract (l 1 (y 1 ), l 2 (y 2 )) = (l 1 (x 1 +B), l 2 (x 2 -B)). Her second period action a 2 is a strictly monotonically increasing function of earnings management B if < , the utility function U 2 is twice continuously differentiable.
In addition, it is assumed that the second order condition w. r. t. the agent's second period action choice a 2 is negative.
Proof:
Let I 1 = 0 denote the first order condition w. r. t. the agent's second period action choice a 2 (compare the corresponding "argmax"-condition EM.5). As I 1 is continuously partially differentiable w. r. t. a 2 and B, the equation I 1 = 0 implicitly defines a 2 contingent on B.
Implicit function theorem then requires 
Proposition 2:
The agent is offered an earnings-based memoryless contract
Earnings management B is a strictly monotonically decreasing function of first period's cash flow
(ii) the agent is risk-averse with U t '' < 0 , the utility functions U t are twice continuously differentiable.
In addition, it is assumed that the second order condition w. r. t. earnings management B is negative.
Proof:
Let I 2 = 0 denote the first order condition w. r. t. earnings management B (compare the corresponding "argmax"-condition EM.4). As I 2 is continuously partially differentiable w. r. t. B and x 1 , the equation
Implicit function theorem then requires
The reverse effect is due to the "tidiness" or "clean surplus" property of accrual accounting.
, the second order condition w. r. 
Inefficiency Result
Proposition 3:
Then the ex-ante optimal solution (l 1 (y 1 ), l 2 (y 2 )) is ex-post, that is at the beginning of period 2, inefficient. (7) with B * , a 2 * : optimal earnings management and second period action pair and B , ã 2 : every other earnings management and second period action pair.
The first inequality is another formulation of the agent's second period action selection constraint (EM.5), the second follows because ã 2 is the unique optimal choice for an agent of type B . Thus B can be viewed as the type of the agent which is not exogenously given but determined endogenously in the first period.
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In order to overcome the problem of ex-post inefficiency, theory would suggest renegotiation-proof contracts, which may imply menus of contracts for the second period, i. e. one contract for each type B, and mixed strategies. Such earnings-based contracts are not common in reality, which may be because of confidence between the parties that the agent will not renegotiate at the beginning of the second period.
8 Contractible is the sole public information 11 yxB =+.
9
If B were monitorable, there would be two alternatives for how it could be incorporated in the contract. First, the principal may undo the earnings management, effectively compensating the agent on a cash flow basis, protecting the principal from being worse off compared to a dynamic cash flow based contract. Second, principal and agent may select B cooperatively. For the first alternative compare Lambert (1981) , pp. 165; for the second Chiappori et al. (1996) , p. 1541; for scenarios with the agent's access to capital markets. 10 Compare Chiappori et al. (1996) , p. 1541, in a context with the agent's free access to capital markets.
Earnings Management versus Cash Flow Regime
The result can be stated as follows: 
)).
The proof is delegated to the Appendix. It is based on a variation of the optimal solution 11 to program
,. In the appendix it is shown that the agent is indifferent to the variation, however the principal is strictly better off.
12 As the variation is chosen so that the optimal actions (a 1 , a 2 ) are the same under the variations as under the benchmark Program CF, welfare gains can be attributed to improved risk sharing.
More accurately, earnings management allows the agent to spread first-period risk over both periods. 13 Therefore the (risk-neutral) principal can lower the expected wage payment to implement the optimal action pair without violating the agent's reservation utility. Consequently the agency is strictly better off.
The reverse effect -B is a constant at the beginning of the second period and from this standpoint does not affect second period risk. As B is a function in x 1 , risk is carried from the first to the second period. Proposition 4 thus can be understood that the risk-decreasing effect of earnings management in the first period dominates the risk-increasing effect of the reverse effect -B in the second period.
Be aware that the Pareto improvement caused by earnings management in the agent's self interest is the consequence of the fact that the memoryless benchmark contract is not the optimal dynamic cash flow-based contract. This naturally leads to
Proposition 5:
Let (l 1 (x 1 ), l 2 (x 1 , x 2 )) be the optimal dynamic, cash flow based contract with memory and (l 1 (y 1 ), l 2 (y 1 , y 2 )) be the corresponding earnings based contract with moral hazard w. r. t. the reporting of y 1 .
First period profits y 1 are subject to earnings management. Then, even if the reporting system has the tidiness property, contracts (l 1 (x 1 ), l 2 (x 1 , x 2 )) strictly Pareto dominate contracts (l 1 (y 1 ), l 2 (y 1 , y 2 )).
Proof:
A formal proof, following the lines of the preceding proof, may be provided. As proposition 5 is not central, the proof is omitted. Reference is made to the motivation of Rogerson (1985) . 12 The consequences of the agent's access to capital markets compared to a no-access regime can be assessed with the same proof technique if the variations are changed slightly.
13
As B cannot depend on the realisation of x 2 , it is reasonable and easy to show that earnings management does not alleviate second-period risk.
The analysis presented in this paper can help to understand why real dynamic remuneration schemes tend to be based on earnings, not on cash flows, even if the agent is allowed to manipulate earnings in her own best interest. Although cash flow based contracts with memory c. p. strictly Pareto-dominate memoryless ones, the welfare improvement may be outweighed by an increment of transaction costs, i. e., costs of writing and specifying the memory contract. Or agent's will not accept memory contracts because they feel to carry bad results of former periods until the end of the agency relationship.
Then, the principal has to offer memoryless contracts and Proposition 4 is applied, stating the Pareto dominance of earnings-based contracts over cash flow-based contracts.
The assumption that the agent has no access to capital markets tends to be rather strong. Nevertheless, the results are of relevance as they can proxy cases in which the agent's access to credit markets is constrained. To see this, consider the following diagram which illustrates the sign of marginal changes in the principal's expected utility (see Appendix (18)) induced by the variations ( (6) and (7)).
The graphs can be interpreted that the likelihood ratio weights the decreasing function B. The left part of graph B represents earnings management in order to realize higher profits and thus is of relevance for the agent in the presence of constrained credit markets. From the proof it becomes clear that in
many constellations, the left part is sufficient for a Pareto improvement in the presence of credit constraints. Thus, also if profit diminishing earnings management is possibly substituted by the agent's saving decisions, the principal is better off by providing a flexible reporting system which allows the agent increasing first period profit. The intuition for the welfare improvement may be that the agent manages earnings, but works harder in the second period (see Proposition 1). The analysis of earnings management in a scenario with unconstrained borrowing and lending is offered in the concluding section III.
Finally, proposition 4 is illustrated by an example. The scenario of programs BP and CF is specified by the additional assumptions of the "LEN-Model" 14 in order to obtain explicit solutions. Therefore attention again is restricted to the situation in which the principal is risk-neutral and the agent's peri- 
III Earnings Management with Access to Capital Markets 1 The Agent's Strategy
The scenario of paragraph 2.1 is enriched by the agent's access to capital markets which is assumed not to be monitorable by the principal. To keep the analysis simple I assume that the interest rate and time preference are zero. k 1 denotes the agent's first period consumption. Consequently her second period consumption k 2 can be expressed by
At the end of the first period the agent chooses earnings management and consumption to maximize her expected utility from that point onwards up to the end of the contracting horizon. That is,
It is supposed that (9) can be represented by the following first order conditions:
Hence the agent changes her strategy: from (11) it follows that she maximizes her remuneration (first period's wage plus expected second period wage) by earnings management; (10) means that she maximizes her utility (first period's utility plus expected second period utility) via borrowing or lending from capital markets. Condition (11) therefore indicates that the agent smoothes earnings independently of whether or not the earnings based contract exhibits memory.
16 This has to be compared to the tendency for conservative reporting in the case of a memory contract without access to capital markets (see section II.2). The capital market now takes over the earnings management's former role (see II.2) as the device to give the agents consumption the optimal intertemporal structure, whereas earnings management's unique function is the maximization of wages.
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Welfare Aspects
The above given interpretation of the first order conditions ((10) and (11)), noticing a change in the agent's strategy, motivates the following proposition:
Proposition 6: x 2 ) ) denote the optimal cash flow based contract and (l 1KM (y 1 ), l 2KM (·, y 2 )) the optimal earnings based contract. The agent has access to capital markets. First period profits y 1 are subject to earnings management, and the reporting system has the tidiness property. Then, contract
The Pareto improvement resulting from earnings management under moral hazard (Proposition 4) crucially depends on intertemporal smoothing of earnings under constrained access to capital markets. 16 The agent's attempt to maximize compensation will be achieved by smoothing behaviour if the sharing rules of both periods have the same shape (reasonable assumption if preferences and production technology are similar in both periods). 17 The deduction and result contrast Tzur/Yaari (1994) , p.60, who propose that the manager either smoothes or overreports.
As explained, with free access to borrowing and saving, the agent uses capital markets to smooth consumption over time. Thus, the mechanism driving Proposition 4 cannot be effective. Consequently, the principal is strictly worse off under the earnings management regime.
IV Conclusion
The paper focuses on welfare aspects of earnings management in dynamic agency relationships with full commitment. The main result are conditions for a Pareto improvement in a suboptimal contractual arrangement. The positive welfare effect can be attributed to improved risk sharing. This can be traced back to the agent's intertemporal smoothing behaviour which follows from utility-maximizing earnings management. Although the formal proof is derived in a setting without access to capital markets, it is shown that the intuition of the result extends to constrained access to credit markets.
********** Appendix:
Proof of Proposition 4
Consider variations of the optimal solution 18 to program CF (l 1 (x 1 ), l 2 (x 2 )) of the form
ε is a sufficiently small, positive constant. The following notation is used: 
Second-Period Action:
Substituting the specific variation (2) in (EM.5), the agent's decision for the second period action is 
Rearranging gives The term in curly brackets on the left hand side (l. h. s.) is the first order condition for the second period action choice under the cash flow regime, the term subtracted is zero. Consequently, for sufficiently small variations, the optimal second-period action remains unchanged.
Next I have to prove that the perturbations (1) and (2) leave [ ] E H 1 , the agent's expected utility from the end of the first period onwards, unchanged.
Earnings management in the agent's self-interest:
The benchmark program does not contain an incentive compatibility constraint w. r. t. earnings management. Therefore it has to be determined how the variations (1) and (2) 
.
Using first order Taylor approximations at x 1 and x 2 and noting that by the previous argument, a 2 is not affected by small perturbations, we get: 
Therefore, the agent is indifferent w. r. t. very small earnings management-like variations (ε close enough to zero). This harmonizes with the fact that larger perturbations (as a first order Taylor polynomial is no longer an appropriate approximation) will modify the agent's expected utility and thus could be used in the utility-maximizing manner described in the model.
First-period action:
As a 2 remains unchanged and [ ] E H 1 , the agent's expected utility from the end of the first period onwards, is unaffected by the variations, we can conclude that the agent's first-period action a 1 is the same in the earnings management and cash flow regime. The formal proof is presented to be complete.
. Under the variation, the agent chooses the first period action maximizing the expected utility over both random variables X 1 and X 2 :
[ ] The terms in curly brackets are the first order condition corresponding to the first period action choice in the benchmark case, the remaining integral on the l. h. s. is zero. Therefore, for sufficiently small perturbations, the optimal first-period action remains unchanged.
Individual rationality constraint:
With this specific (and sufficiently small) variation the first and second period actions remain unchanged, and the agent's expected utility over both periods is the same as in the cash flow regime.
Consequently the agent's participation constraint is not violated. It remains to show that the principal is strictly better off.
Principal's expected utility:
Substituting the variations (1) and (2) in the principal's expected utility over both random variables X 1 and X 2 gives: [ ] 
The optimal benchmark contracts (l 1 (x 1 ), l 2 (x 2 )) satisfy: Thus, the principal is strictly better off. Q. e. d.
